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This paper attempts to engage with the established debate on the nature of heterodox 
economics. However, it starts from the position that previous attempts to classify and 
identify heterodox economics have been biased towards a priori definition. The paper 
aims to inform the discussion of the nature of heterodoxy with some empirical analysis. 
The paper examines survey data collected from a small/medium-sized sample of AHE 
members on the core concepts in economics. The paper applies factor analysis to the data. 
It also applies principles of biological taxonomy, and thence cluster analysis to the 
problem. The paper finds that within the self-identified community of self-identified 
heterodox economists there is little agreement as to whether members are pluralist, or 
what their attitude is to the mainstream. Indeed, there is little agreement on any core 
concepts or principles. The paper argues that there is little structure to heterodox 
economics beyond that provided by pre-existing (or constituent) schools of thought. 
Based on this study, heterodox economics appears a complex web of interacting 
individuals and as a group is a fuzzy set. These results would lead us to question further 
strict distinctions between heterodox, mainstream and pluralist economists. 
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What is heterodox economics? The term is now established in the literature, arguably 
more firmly than at any other time. It was used originally in the 1930s and 1940s (Ayres, 
1936; Commons, 1932, 1936; Gruchy, 1947, 1948) but has gained popularity mainly in 
the 1990s and beyond (see Lee, 2009 for a full historical treatment). The term is even 
being used by mainstream economists (heterodox approaches have their own JEL 
classification, B5). Projects are being funded to investigate how heterodox economics 
might enhance economics teaching and to develop resources to do this (for example, in 
the UK via the Economics Network). The Association for Heterodox Economists has now 
held 11 successful annual conferences plus numerous other events, including 
postgraduate training workshops and seminars. All of this suggests that the heterodox 
economics community is vibrant; and thus by extension, heterodox economics is strong.  
 
At the same time though, there is considerable debate as to what exactly heterodox 
economics is. In the next section of the paper it will be briefly argued that there is no 
agreed concept of heterodox economics, only competing definitions based usually on 
totalising dualistic distinctions between orthodox (or mainstream) and heterodox. It is 
claimed that all existing treatments of heterodox are based on a priori definitions. This 
                                                 
1 This paper has benefited from comments received at a session of the Association for Heterodox 
Economics conference at Kingston University, July 2009. Thanks go to the discussant at that session, Ioana 
Negru, and to Lynne Chester, Paul Downward and Don Webber for other comments. The usual disclaimer 
applies.    2 
paper attempts to contribute to the debate by investigating the nature of heterodox 
economics empirically. The remainder of the paper will try to move away from this a 
priori approach and begin an investigation based on an empirical data. This treatment 
takes seriously the notion that heterodox economists know who they are and what 
heterodox economics is by asking them about their core beliefs in economics. A range of 
statistical techniques, including factor and cluster analysis, is then applied to the data. 
The results suggest that heterodox economics is difficult to define, and that the heterodox 
community is diverse complex of individuals, groups and ideas. Strict distinctions 
between heterodox and other approaches to economics seem unwarranted. However, 




This section offers a very brief meta-analysis of definitions of heterodox economics. The 
literal meaning of heterodox is as ‘not orthodox’. Dequech (2007-8) offers a helpful 
analysis of existing definitions of heterodox and finds that it is difficult to arrive at one 
which adequately describes the current heterodox community other than ‘not orthodox’. 
This is rather unsatisfactory because it appears to undersell heterodox economics, which 
in its traditional composite elements, such as Marxism and Keynesianism, would appear 
to be more than merely critique. Both Marxism and Keynesianism, for example, contain 
constructive programmes of economic theory (albeit in an interdisciplinary way), 
economic method, logic, ontology, politics, ethics, etc. which differ from those espoused 
by the mainstream economics. However, even if the components of heterodox economics   3 
have such characteristics, it does not follow that heterodox economics does. Nonetheless, 
perhaps aware of the agenda of not appearing merely critical, several economists have 
offered explicit or implicit definitions of heterodox economics. 
 
Thus we have a range of definitions. Lee (2009) defines heterodox economics, rightly, as 
a concatenation of ideas, but identifies it as being based on the notion of an analysis of 
the provisioning process as being necessarily social, whereas mainstream economics 
views the provisioning process in asocial (individualistic) terms. Lawson (2006) goes to a 
different level to define mainstream economics in terms of the insistence on the use of 
mathematical modelling in economics and that heterodox economics entails the rejection 
of this approach. The composition of the Association for Heterodox Economists defines 
heterodoxy in terms of specific pre-existing schools of non-mainstream thought. Yet, the 
contents of George (2008) suggest heterodoxy being something very different. Others 
attempt to define the mainstream (and by implication, heterodoxy). Davis (2009) suggests 
support for Lee’s definition by identifying the essence of mainstream economics as 
individualism, plus beliefs in the centrality of equilibrium and rationality. Arnsperger and 
Varoufakis (2009) define neo-classical economics somewhat similarly, in terms of 
methodological individualism, methodological instrumentalism and methodological 
equilibriation. By implication, heterodox economics does not meet these critieria. 
 
How well do these definitions describe the current heterodox communities? It could be 
argued that Lawson’s definition does best, because it is true that none of the current 
heterodox communities insist on the use of mathematics. It is also strongly arguable that   4 
the mainstream does insist on mathematical modelling; it is also true that such a 
movement is a powerful force in economics. Thus, Lawson’s definition has some utility. 
However, in other ways it is rather unsatisfactory, perhaps because it appears rather 
narrow. The definition itself – although Lawson would acknowledge the wider nature of 
heterodoxy – also does not capture the notion identified by Lee as heterodox economics 
as a concatenation of ideas; in other words, a complex system. However, if we try to 
apply either Lee’s (2009) or Davis’ (2009) definitions, different problems are 
encountered. The most obvious anomaly is Austrian economists, who are regarded as 
heterodox in many ways. For example, they do not believe in individual rationality in the 
mainstream sense, see markets as non-equilibrium systems, note the importance of time, 
history and change, and emphasise uncertainty. They certainly do not fit into Davis’ 
description of mainstream economics. However, neither do they accord with many 
aspects of heterodox groups: for instance, they neglect power, they tend to be politically 
different from other heterodox groups, and they view markets as essentially likely to be 
effective. They also hold individualism (albeit differently from mainstream economists). 
Thus they do not fit into Lee’s category of heterodox economics either. Similar 
arguments could be made about many heterodox schools. One might argue that any 
literature which does not meet all of Davis’ (or Arnsperger and Vaourfakis’) criteria is 
heterodox; but then this tells us little. 
 
It is easy to see why Dequech (2007-8) might have reached his conclusion that apart from 
in their opposition to the mainstream, there is no way to define heterodox economics. It 
would seem that any adequate definition of heterodox must capture its nature as a   5 
concatenation; but it must also be able to capture the current diversity of the heterodox 
community. These two requirements are in many ways contradictory. Another issue here 
is the question of what type of thing heterodox economics is. Many of the treatments 
implicitly employ set theory to define heterodox economics. Dequech explicitly uses the 
term empty set. Other authors seem to envisage heterodox economics as a crisp, closed 
set, strictly distinct from mainstream thought. Often, heterodox and mainstream thought 
seem to be all-encompassing categories (see Mearman, 2007). Indeed, it could be argued 
that their definitions are constructed in order to construct two mutually exclusive, often 
encompassing categories or sets. 
 
One issue with sets is that their memberships depend utterly on their definition. There can 
though be different ways to arrive at these definitions. Some authors may take an 
Aristotelian or Lockean tack and look for some sort of essence of the object. Lawson’s 
(2006) treatment can be interpreted as claiming that mainstream and heterodox 
economics have essential properties. Some writers reject such types of claim. Others may 
take a Wittgensteinian view that categories are based on ‘family resemblances’ and on 
uses. So, the term heterodox can be used to describe together groups which have some 
similarities but may or may not be essentially the same. Or, the meaning of heterodox 
varies according to use. There is some support for this view in noting that there are a 
number of ways to slice mainstream from heterodox economics, according the purpose of 
the writer. Someone, whose focus on policy, might well lump together Austrians and 
mainstream economists. 
   6 
One criticism of the above approaches is that they are a prioristic. It is possible to define 
heterodox economics in terms of concepts; but equally it can be defined in terms of 
populations of self-defined heterodox economists. That way, one can identify heterodox 
economic ideas but also the make-up of a self-identified heterodox economist. Indeed, 
this is the approach taken in recent developments in zoological taxonomy: there has been 
a move away from thinking in terms of types to thinking in terms of populations of 
breeding creatures. This may generate an image unpleasant to some, of economists 
breeding. And of course, in some ways it is an inappropriate metaphor. In other ways, 
though, it might capture quite well the activities of economists exchanging ideas, acting 
in communities, borrowing on the genetics of the groups they are in, sharing common 
ancestors. Such an approach would require an historical account of individual 
economists, which is beyond the scope of this paper
2. However, one key idea present in 
the new zoological taxonomy is adopted here: that of gathering together a ‘breeding 
population’ – viz. self-identified heterodox economists – and then building up 
descriptions of heterodoxy from statements made by those economists about the 




Data was collected via a questionnaire. The questionnaire was received in three ways: 
first, questionnaires were distributed at the conference of the Association for Heterodox 
Economists (AHE) conference in Cambridge, UK in July 2008. An announcement was 
                                                 
2 The scale of this task is illustrated by works which might be said to aim to do the same thing: e.g. 
histories of schools of thought (King, 2002); or works which link past economists to newer ideas, such as 
Critical Realism (see, for example, Fleetwood, 1996), or general equilibrium theory (Hollander, 1981).    7 
made by the author at the conference for questionnaires to be completed. In order to 
capture people who did not complete the questionnaire at the time, and also to capture 
people who are self-identified heterodox economists by virtue of being AHE members, 
two further appeals were made to attract respondents via the AHE listserv. Respondents 
were able to either post or e-mail their responses to the author. It should be noted that in 
terms of data reliability this may raise concerns because of order effects (see, for 
example, Macauley, et al, 1971). However, soliciting responses from the listserv also 
reduces possible bias in the conference attendees.  
 
The questionnaire can be viewed in the Appendix. It was headed ‘What are the core 
economic precepts?’ in order to deflect respondents from its main purpose; namely to 
ascertain a definition of heterodox economics. The heading also had the benefit of being 
usable in wider groups of economists. The questionnaire asks respondents to offer their 
degree of agreement with a series of statements. Respondents could agree completely 
(with a score of 10), disagree completely (score of 0) or offer partial 
agreement/disagreement or hedge their answers by choosing intermediate scores. 
Respondents answered on a sliding scale which had no numbers to guide them. This was 
done because it was felt that respondents might be driven to choose given numbers. In 
one particular case, where the score of 5 could have been shown, this may have been a 
specific concern, partly because it might reduce variation in the data
3.  
 
                                                 
3 For the purpose of analysis, the numbers were converted to values between 0 and 1.    8 
The questions were derived from the literature on heterodoxy and from schools regarded 
as traditionally heterodox. Principally two main criteria were used for selection: 1) 
mainstream concepts, in order to assess the extent to which heterodox economics is 
merely a rejection of the mainstream; and 2) concepts associated with heterodox 
economics from the literature. In order to reflect the literature, a mixture of 
methodological and theoretical points was included. Inevitably there will be concepts 
which were potentially includable which have been omitted. The most obvious candidate 
is any explicit reference to institutions; i.e. the concept of institutions was not used 
explicitly, although things which may be considered as institutions (e.g. money) were 
included. However, many of the concepts included (e.g. history and power) are of 
relevance to institutionalist economists. The intention in the balance of questions was to 
address key elements of mainstream economics plus other elements from other 
constituent schools of heterodox economics. Thus, the inclusion of class should score 
highly amongst Marxist and Post Keynesian economists, money should score highly with 
Post Keynesians, uncertainty with Post Keynesian and Austrians, power with Marxists 
and institutionalists, gender with feminists and perhaps institutionalists and Marxists, etc. 
However, it may also be true that many self-identified heterodox economists retain 
beliefs or use concepts held by the mainstream. This explains further the relevance of 
placing responses on a sliding scale rather than on a yes/no basis.  
 
Four issues with the data should be noted. First, responses were measured off the page 
manually. This may generate some measurement and rounding error. Second, it may be 
argued that respondents’ feelings may not be accurately measured by this scale. This is   9 
unavoidable in such survey situations. In pilot draft of the questionnaire respondents were 
asked a supplementary question for each main question: ‘how confident are you in your 
answer?’ However, this led to what was judged to be an unreasonable level of detail and 
was removed. Third, some people may be serial high responders. This could bias the 
scores overall in favour of those people. It is possible to recalibrate these scores but it 
was decided that they should remain as recorded, because the strength of feeling 
expressed may well be reflected in the strength of feeling within the organisation. So, if 
specific groups of people tended to hold strong views, this would influence the tenor of 
debate within the larger group. This could be a finding per se. For this reason, as well as 
wanting to preserve the original data, raw data scores were kept
4. Fourth, it should be 
recognised that the questions arguably address different types of thing. Just as Dow 
(2004) does, we can imagine schools of thought as layered. The concepts of pluralism 
and fallibility could be said to operate on a lower level than do schools of thought. It is 
not clear whether these two methodological drivers have the same impact on the school 
memberships. This affects our interpretation of the results. For example, we might view 
our regressions as nested equations rather than a single equation. Also, in terms of the 
interpretation of cluster analysis, the different types of variates matters. In taxonomy, 
cluster analysis is used to group objects on the basis of similarity in terms of 
characteristics in order to then assess genetic identity of the objects. Our variates may be 
said to combine characteristics and genetic factors. However, arguably the variates are all 
methodological rather than theoretical and can be regarded as comparable.  
                                                 
4 In results not shown here, descriptive statistics for each case were generated. Particular attention was paid 
to the mean and mode scores for each case, as well as standard deviation. Cases with means lower than 0.4 
and higher than 0.6, SD higher than 0.4, and mode at either 0 or 1 were examined further. Although some 
tentative patterns may be found, such as that self-confessed Marxists often answered 0 or 1, and 0 for 




The data has been analysed in a range of ways. Descriptive statistics, as ever can aid the 
narrative considerably. These are followed by a discussion of factor analysis and cluster 




43 responses were received. Based on an AHE membership of roughly 250
5, this is a 
response rate of 17%. This can be considered somewhat disappointing although within 
the normal range for online surveys. One might conventionally interpret the rate and the 
low n as making the data poor and the results also. There are two main issues here. One is 
that the small sample makes inference difficult. All inferences to populations from 
samples should be done carefully and in this case the need is stronger. However, if we 
take the results are totally sample specific, then references to superpopulations and 
statistical significance become irrelevant. For our purposes, the sample is the population. 
Second, the small sample affects the efficacy of the techniques used. The results from the 
analysis should be viewed even more cautiously than necessary. As a final point, we 
should note that some of the questionnaires were not completed, with one or two 
questions unanswered. These missing values were filled by imputing values using SPSS.  
 
                                                 
5 No precise figure was available for AHE membership in 2008. The number was 167 in 2006, and 258 in 
2007. Each year there are new members but also some memberships lapse. The figure of 250 is a rough 
estimate.   11 
Table 1 here 
 
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1. The descriptive statistics show some 
predictable and some more surprising results. The variation in responses is quite 
pronounced, although it differs between questions. There is a strong willingness to 
recognise oneself as heterodox (unsurprisingly in this context), and (to a lesser extent) as 
pluralist, perhaps reflecting that pluralism was the theme of a succession of AHE 
conferences. The score for mainstream is not high, yet clearly non-zero, suggesting that 
the heterodox group still recognises some mainstream label. There may be some key 
issues which cause disagreement in the heterodox community. E.g. labour and scarcity 
have large standard deviations. However, there were also high scores for history and 
power which are traditional heterodox concerns. The scores for uncertain and fallibility 
are also high, although for both (echoing the statistics for pluralist) variation of response 
is also quite high.  
 
Table 2 here 
 
Table 2 shows statistically significant correlations between variates. The first thing to 
note is that there is a strong negative correlation (r = -.438) between heterodox and 
mainstream. This statistic supports the thesis that heterodox is analytically defined (at 
least partly) as a rejection of mainstream economics. However, in an association such as 
the AHE, such an oppositional stance will inevitably also reflect sociological factors. 
Also possibly significant is that the opening questions were in terms of how the   12 
respondent sees themselves, rather than in judging concepts. If we then look at the 
correlation between heterodox and mainstream concepts, the picture is less clear. 
Correlations between heterodox and concepts such as positive, rational, equilibrium, 
markets, maths and even scarcity are negative but small. There is stronger evidence of 
rejection of mainstream economic concepts in the stronger correlations between those 
concepts and specific traditionally heterodox concepts: for example, class is strongly 
negatively correlated with several mainstream concepts. History is strongly negatively 
correlated with equilibrium (echoing Robinson, 1974 perhaps), individuals and scarcity. 
Power has consistent negative correlation with mainstream concepts. Further, mainstream 
concepts are correlated with each other, as are several groups of traditionally heterodox 
concepts: for example, class is strongly positively correlated with power, labour, gender 
and negatively with individuals (not surprisingly), positive and markets. Uncertain is 
strongly correlated with fallibility, (negatively with) maths and, perhaps reflecting 




The correlations suggest (together with the practical need to reduce the data) factor 
analysis might be appropriate. Significantly, Table 2 suggests significant clusters of 
concepts which are correlated with each other. These associations can be readily assessed   13 
by factor analysis, the results of which are shown in Table 3, which displays factors 
derived by principal components analysis after a varimax rotation
6.  
 
Table 3 here 
 
Nonetheless, the results shown in Table 3 are intuitively sensible and reflect the results 
from the bivariate correlations shown in Table 2. The second factor has high loadings on 
class, power, labour, gender and (negatively) markets. Factor 2 might thus be called a 
‘radical’ (or perhaps Marxist-feminist) grouping. Factor 3 might be an ‘Austrian’ 
grouping, associating uncertainty, individualism and fallibility. Factor 4 is perhaps a 
‘Post Keynesian’ group which stresses money and history. Factor 5 suggests an 
‘ecological economics’ group which stresses natural systems, but also the use of 
mathematics.  
 
Factor 1 might be called a mainstream factor. Significantly, this factor groups rational, 
equilibrium and scarcity. This may reflect a bias within heterodox economics as to what 
constitutes the mainstream: i.e. if heterodox economists associate scarcity, equilibrium 
and rationality with the mainstream, they may reject them more easily. The finding also 
partly supports Davis’ (2009) definition of the mainstream in terms of equilibrium, 
rationality and individualism. However, the adoption of individualism by Austrian 
economists means that the adoption of individualism alone cannot be a definition of the 
mainstream; it also complicates the division between mainstream and heterodox. Further, 
                                                 
6 The results of this analysis must be treated with care, given the low sample size. There are sixteen 
variates shown here and only 43 cases. The ratio of cases to variates is thus lower than 3:1, whereas most 
treatments of factor analysis usually recommend a ratio of 5:1 or even 10:1 (Hair, et al, 2006: 122).   14 
the mean scores for ‘mainstream concepts’, although consistently lower than heterodox 
concepts, are consistently non-zero. Also, although there was a significant negative 
correlation between mainstream and heterodox, the correlation coefficient was only 
|.438|, meaning that many respondents regard themselves as mainly as clearly defined 
heterodox economists – yet with important element of mainstream economics thrown in. 
Heterodox economists are a mixture of concepts and influences. An alternative 
interpretation is that heterodox and mainstream are overlapping categories. The other 
clear finding for this group is that in terms of concepts, heterodox economics remains a 
concatenation of ideas (echoing Lee’s (2009) term) and groupings of individuals. 
 
The factor analysis suggests robust and strong associations between sets of variables 
which are intuitively sensible: e.g. radical, mainstream, Austrian, PK and ecological 
economists. Cronbach’s alpha statistics suggest that factors 1-3 are the most robust. This 
interpretation is questioned by the results from factor analysis including pluralist as a 
variate, wherein fallibility combines with pluralist rather than with factor 3. A decision 
must be made then about whether to choose five factors or six. In statistical terms (sizes 
of eigenvalues, amount of variance explained and Cronbach’s alpha) there is little to 
choose. However, the first set of factors (shown) seemed intuitively more sensible than 
the second because they echo schools of thought. Furthermore, pluralist could be seen as 
more of an outcome variate than the others; and when the other outcome variates 
heterodox and mainstream were included they did not generate sensible factors: thus the 
factors in Table 3 were chosen as the workable solution.  
   15 
Regression analysis 
 
Conventionally, we might take investigate the determinants of heterodox economics via 
regression analysis. I.e., run a regression with heterodox as the dependent variable. When 
this was done (via OLS), the results were rather unconvincing. Again, this is subject to 
problems of sample size. Only one variate (money) was shown to be statistically 
significant. This would conventionally be regarded as a problem but given we are not 
inferring to the population, this is not necessarily a problem. However, the regression was 
also subject to other problems. It may also be argued that given that we have different 
types of variates on the right hand side of the equation – specifically some are 
methodological , some theoretical – it is possible that rather than analyse a single 
equation, we actually have a set of nested equations. In addition, there were problems of 
Normality of residuals, low explanatory power and multicollinearity; so the results are 
ignored.  
 
Factor analysis can be, as shown above, a useful method for describing data. It is also 
useful (and perhaps is best known) as a data reduction technique. Here we can use factor 
analysis to reduce the number of independent variates in the regression. The analysis thus 
far has suggested some hints as to the definition of heterodox economics. This analysis 
can be taken a step further by examining OLS analysis of the determinants of heterodox 
economics. However, although statistically significant coefficients were found, they were 
all small; thus the regression analysis did not inform us much.  
   16 
Factor analysis assesses relationships of interdependence between variates. However, it is 
arguable that this method looks at the data inappropriately. Here we might draw on the 
literature on taxonomy. This is apt because one of the things we are interested in is 
whether anything called heterodox economics coheres around individuals. This approach 
reflects the argument that heterodox economists are able to self-select and that by 
examining them we can divine what heterodox economics is. Alternatively, if we are 
confident of what heterodox economics is, we can group economists according to that 
definition. Such considerations are the concerns of taxonomy. In that discipline a move 
has occurred between typological descriptions of objects to one based on genetics (see, 
for example, Mayr, 1969; Goto, 1982). In new approaches, objects are grouped into 
phena (i.e. some similarities) and then genetic connections are sought. The latter 
approach therefore takes certain characteristics as ways of grouping objects (cases). In 
the literature this is described as numerical taxonomy. Such an approach would examine 
relationships between numerical measures of characteristics of each case. This stage of 
analysis would then lead to explanations of genetic relationships; which here would mean 
historical studies of people’s education and influences. The principal goal of this section 
of the paper is to identify groupings of cases occur. For this purpose, cluster analysis 
shall be used. Cluster analysis involves the examination of relations between cases rather 
than between variates. Indeed, at this point, the paper shifts its focus from variates and 
very much onto cases. 
 
Cluster analysis 
   17 
Cluster analysis has several advantages.
 7 Its main advantage that it allows the data to 
speak – “the classification of data as suggested by natural groupings of the data 
themselves” (Hair et al, 2006: 559). Cluster analysis allows a variety of research goals to 
be pursued, and is particularly useful for basic description of complex data sets. Like 
factor analysis it can be a useful means of data reduction. This flexibility has allowed it to 
be used in a range of settings, and not just in zoology and related areas. However, there 
are some disadvantages of cluster analysis. Cluster analysis is not capable of inference, 
which to some limits it usefulness. The technique itself will always generate clusters, 
perhaps giving the impression that more structure present than is actually the case. The 
principal disadvantage of the method is that each clustering identified is highly dependent 
on the cluster variates specified by the researcher. Thus, the extent to which the data 
speak for themselves is severely restricted. Cluster analysis therefore does not avoid the 
problem of a priori classification; although it could be said to mitigate it somewhat.  
 
Clusters are formed on the basis of either similarity or dissimilarity. Either way, some 
measure of (dis)similarity is necessary. There are two main schools of thought on this 
question: to use distance measures or correlational measures. The correlational approach 
suggests that we simply correlate between cases rather than variables. This may allow us 
to find groupings based on association. Often this is done to identify what might be 
described as outliers. In this paper these correlations constitute a significant piece of 
analysis because they allow us to examine the existence of groups.  
 
                                                 
7 Hair, et al (2006, ch. 8) discuss the key concepts in cluster analysis. Much of this discussion draws on that 
source. Interested readers should consult Hair et al.   18 
Table 4 summarises the set of bivariate correlations between cases across responses to all 
questions. A strong correlation is one which is greater than |0.5|
8. It shows that 29 of the 
43 cases are strongly correlated with at least 21 other cases. 12 cases have strong 
correlations with at least 31 others. That suggests that there is a core set of cases which 
have a degree of disagreement across issues of concern. However, although many of the 
correlations of these cases with others were with other core members, not all were. Take 
case 3 as an example. It had the (joint) highest number of strong correlations with other 
cases, 33. Of these 33, 10 were with other ‘core’ cases; but one was with a ‘marginal’ 
case (with 10 or fewer strong correlations) and many more (22) were with cases in the 
middle. Case 14 also had 33 strong correlations which were distributed in a similar way 
(11, 1, 21). The consistency of this result is of course contingent on the r = 0.5 threshold 
for strong correlations and on 31 strong correlations being the threshold for core 
membership (for example, 6 cases had exactly 30 strong correlations). Subject to these 
caveats, some conclusions can be drawn about the sample. It suggests that the heterodox 
community displays contradictory facets: on the one hand it may be seen to have a strong 
core; but on the other hand there is a variety of views within it and perhaps some rather 
peripheral members. In between there are large numbers of people in intermediate 
agreement with the core.  
 
Table 4 here 
 
                                                 
8 This figure may be considered arbitrary – and indeed it is somewhat – but in this case the figure filters out 
even correlations which are statistically significant at the 5% level so is quite strict. Further the findings 
from this technique are compared with others, so any loss from arbitrariness is mitigated.   19 
In addition to looking at this overall picture, one can examine the so-called marginal or 
peripheral members. These are those with 10 strong correlations or fewer. The 
correlations between peripheral members are shown in Table 5. Analysing these 
peripheral members suggests several things. In some instances, mini clusters form, e.g. 
between cases 16, 18, and 31. More often, what emerges is a complex picture. There are 
cases which appear outliers yet which are strongly connected to some others, and in some 
cases to core cases. On this basis, the community of heterodox economics then looks like 
a complex system of interconnections.  
 
Table 5 here 
 
Correlational methods look at patterns in the cases but not the distances between them, so 
they are perhaps less able to identify (dis)similarity. The distance method allows us to 
begin forming clusters on the basis of (dis)similarity in terms of distance. In hierarchical 
cluster methods, this occurs iteratively, as the most similar (least dissimilar) observations 
are progressively grouped together
9. Ultimately, one cluster may form (unless we choose 
to specify the number of clusters which will form). In this sense, cluster analysis is 
usually agglomerative
10. Also, though, because it is iterative, we arrive at hierarchical 
clusters in which the early clusters have closer relationships between cases than the later 
ones do.  
 
                                                 
9 It is also possible to have non-hierarchical cluster methods such as k-means methods which pre-determine 
a number of clusters (see Hair et al, 2006: 581, 585).  
10 As Hair et al (2006: 584) note, cluster formation can be divisive, i.e. it begins with all cases in a single 
cluster and then breaks that down into smaller groups of cases. Most computer packages appear to be 
agglomerative: SPSS takes that approach.    20 
Several options are available when distance measures are used, but perhaps the most 
popular is the Squared Euclidean distance (SqED). It has a number of advantages (see 
Hair et al, 2006: 575). Then one must choose a clustering algorithm. There are several 
options available, all with advantages and disadvantages, mainly in terms of their ability 
to form clusters. Ward’s method, for example, is more likely to construct clusters of 
roughly equal sizes. It is susceptible to outliers but in our data set that is not much of an 
issue. However, all hierarchical methods do have problems, for instance of the 
persistence of early clusters and the influence of outliers. Hair et al (591) recommend that 
some trial and error is used, to test whether the structures identified would change if 
outliers are excluded. Here it was decided, as an exploratory move, to use Ward’s 
method.  
 
Once measure and clustering algorithm have been selected, one must choose grouping 
variates. In zoology, for instance, some (set of) characteristics has to be chosen as the 
basis for grouping cases. These might be in terms of size or colour. Some a priori choice 
must be made as to how to group the cases. The debate between typology (species as 
ideal types) and species as empirically breeding populations is thus undercut. The 
judgement of the investigator is thus crucial.  
 
Cluster analysis requires that the variates used are independent of each other (without 
altering the fact that cluster analysis is an interdependence technique). There is some 
debate about the merits of using factors extracted from the data (as above) (see Hair et al, 
p. 582); their chief benefit being that they ensure independence of variates. An alternative   21 
method is to take variables from each of the factors as the clustering characteristics. In 
small samples, multicollinearity problems may make the clusters generated very sensitive 
to the data. That caveat applies here and adds another degree of caution to our analysis. 
However, in data analysis, a correlation between variates of r > |0.7| is often used as a 
rough indicator of multicollinearity; in our sample no correlations are that high. That 
suggests multicollinearity may not be present. Also, the Variance Inflation Factors 
generated by the OLS regression with all variates as independents did not indicate strong 




When cluster analysis is performed, a dendrogram is produced, which gives a visual 
sketch of relations between cases
12. The dendrogram is shown in Figure 1. In the 
dendrogram cases which are most similar are located next to each other. The tree like 
diagram shows the connection between the cases. The lines show groupings. The 
closeness of cases is shown by the position of the vertical line. The further to the right is 
that line, the less similar the cases are. So, for example, case 26 is closely related to case 
36; it may be said to be in the same group as case 29 or even case 30, but is further away 
                                                 
11 As insurance against these problems, clusters were also estimated with factors as grouping variates, and 
with different combinations of factors and raw variates. Comparing these solutions, there was a degree of 
commonality: 24 cases seemed to remain in the same cluster whatever the grouping variates. However, this 
small number did not allow much further exploration. Further, it could be argued that by selecting raw 
variates (from different factors) the problem of multicollinearity is addressed but the problem of a priori 
definition of the groups is reintroduced. If the clusters derived from selected variates are thus rejected, we 
are left to choose between using all the variates and just the factors. However, the latter course resulted in 
even less structure (six clusters from 43 cases). Thus, it was decided to explore further the original solution 
using all the variates.  
12 Dendrograms resemble cladograms but are interpreted differently. Cladograms infer similarity from 
recency of descent. However, as Mayr (1969) notes, this is generally regarded as unsatisfactory. 
Dendrograms do not have this meaning.   22 
from them than from case 26. The furthermost vertical line indicates that eventually the 
hierarchical cluster method always generates a single cluster. 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
At this point the judgement of the investigator is crucial in deciding how many clusters 
there are in the data. Effectively a cut must be made at what is considered an appropriate 
point. In Figure 1 this cut would appear at a distance of roughly eight. That indicates that 
there are four clusters in the data: from cases 26 to 24, then 5 to 11, then 19 to 23, and 
finally 9 to 35. These clusters have membership sizes twenty, four, eleven and eight 
respectively, which bears similarity to the correlational data above. Further, we can see 
that cases 16, 18, 21, 31 and 35 are all part of the bottom cluster, which appears highly 
distinct from the other three
13. On this basis, the original Ward’s clusters will be 
investigated further. 
  
Table 6 shows mean scores for all variables for each cluster. Obviously there are 
difficulties of comparing different sized samples. Nonetheless, a few key points can be 
made. Cluster A, the largest, is characterised by a rejection of the label ‘mainstream’ and 
to some extent of mainstream concepts (apart from individuals and markets). The second 
feature of cluster 1 is an acceptance of the label as heterodox and pluralist and a matching 
acceptance of general heterodox concepts such as class, uncertainty, fallibility, power, 
                                                 
13 However, there are anomalies, such as cases 1 and 9 both of which had many strong correlations with 
other cases. In support of the clusters, though, a second cluster analysis using average linkage method 
largely confirms the original clusters: cluster D is split into two, cluster A loses one member (case 17, who 
goes to B, which otherwise remains intact) and cluster C loses two members (cases 12 and 40).   23 
money and history. It could be argued that this cluster exemplifies the recently 
developing picture of heterodoxy as being non-mainstream but pluralist, with a concern 
for methodological issues. Almost all of the female respondents to the survey are in this 
group, although it is far from clear why this would occur. Cluster B is rather different, 
exhibiting much stronger rejection of the mainstream and its concepts, maximum scores 
for class and labour and much lower scores than the other clusters for uncertainty and 
fallibility. Methodologically this group did score much higher than cluster 1 on the need 
for maths in economics. Cluster B seems like a Marxist group and indeed its cluster 
members are self-identified radicals.  
 
Cluster C is different from clusters 1 and 2 in that it does not reject the label of being 
mainstream, whilst accepting the labels of heterodox and pluralist. This is an interesting 
finding because this cluster rejects the strict distinctions between the three categories. 
Further, although this cluster accepts many of the traditional heterodox concepts such as 
power, labour and class, it also accepts mainstream notions such as rational, equilibrium, 
positive, maths and crucially, scarcity. Above when factor analysis was conducted, a 
factor was extracted which was labelled ‘mainstream’ whereas the view of cluster 3 
suggests instead this use of mainstream concepts alongside heterodox ones is another 
exhibition of pluralism. This cluster is similar to cluster A but more pluralist. 
Unfortunately these individuals are difficult to identify from the information gleaned so it 
is difficult to draw too many conclusions. It should also be noted that in the dendrogram, 
arguably cluster C might have been split into two, so perhaps not too much coherence 
should be expected. Cluster D is in some ways the most interesting cluster because it   24 
contains most of the cases identified as outliers. The cluster score for mainstream is 
similar to cluster C, but the score for heterodox is lower. Accordingly, scores for core 
heterodox concepts such as class, power, gender and particularly labour are clearly lower 
than for the other clusters. As a corollary, cluster D’s scores for individuals, markets and 
rational are much higher than for the other clusters. Looking at the cases who are 
members of this cluster, they appear to be members of underrepresented elements of 
heterodox thought, such as behavioural economics, Austrian economics, associative 




The data examined here suggests that the group which calls itself heterodox economics is 
a complex object. Some key factors can be identified: a belief that history, natural 
systems, uncertainty and power are all important to understanding economics. There is 
some rejection of mainstream label and associated concepts although the data suggests 
that heterodox economics is not merely a rejection of the mainstream. However, even 
surrounding these general conclusions, there was considerable diversity and little 
evidence of structure. Overall, it seems that heterodox economics is not a monolith.  
 
Clearly there are reasons to be cautious about these findings, not least because of the 
sample size, and that there is only one drawing from the group. Further, the data only 
reveal patterns in nominal data – at best we have identified only nominal essences. More 
work must be done to establish the natures of these groups. Drawing on biological   25 
literature, a next step is to establish the genealogy of the cases and groups of cases and 
draw on existing literature in the history of economic thought, plus conduct deeper 
analysis on individual cases. This work would try to ascertain with whom these 
economists are ‘breeding’ (their ideas) and who their (intellectual) descendants were. 
Clearly the analysis here needs to be complemented by historical and social analyses 
found in, for example, Lee (2009). Future research might apply the same method to a 
group of mainstream economists. In addition, the criticism should be borne in mind that 
the responses to the questions do not exhaust the nature of heterodox economists: their 
membership of groups and their political and work environments (i.e. whether they are 
disadvantaged when searching for employment) will also matter. 
 
However, another pertinent question is whether or not to regard the groups within the 
heterodox population, or indeed heterodox and mainstream, as separate. In the taxonomy 
literature, a distinction is often made between ‘lumpers’ and ‘splitters’ – those whose 
instinct is to, respectively, lump together similar but different cases, or emphasise the 
differences and split them up. Whenever a category is made, there is a dynamic between 
the desire to analyse and the desire to lump. The desire to analyse is reinforced by a 
desire to split. The difference between lumpers and splitters is defined by their emphasis 
of similarity or of difference. The empirical evidence here supports either urge: it 
suggests considerable heterogeneity in that little structure can be found within the 
community of self-identified heterodox economists. However, in other ways, there are 
reasons to lump: there is a shared dislike of the mainstream; and concepts such as history 
are almost universally held. It would seem that there has been a tendency in the   26 
methodological literature discussed at the start of the paper to split. Splitting is something 
humans like to do; whether this act is helpful or not is debatable. Given the apparent 
fuzziness of the categories involved, it seems that splitting ought to be done cautiously, 
provisionally and open to revision.  
   27 
References 
 
Arnsperger, C. and Varoufakis, Y. (2009). ‘Neoclassical Economics – Three Identifying 
Features’, in E. Fullbrook (ed.) Pluralist Economics, London: Zed books.  
Ayres, C. (1936). ‘Fifty Years' Development in Ideas of Human Nature 
and Motivation’, American Economic Review, 26(1): 224-36. 
Commons, J. (1932). ‘Institutional Economics: comment’, American Economic Review, 
22(2): 264-68. 
__________ (1936). ‘Institutional Economics’, American Economic Review, 26(1): 237- 
49. 
Davis, J. (2009). ‘The Nature of Heterodox Economics’, in E. Fullbrook (ed.) Ontology 
and Economics: Tony Lawson and his Critics, London: Routledge. 
Dequech, D. (2007-8). ‘Neoclassical, Orthodox, Mainstream, and Heterodox Economics’, 
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 30(2), Winter: 137-160. 
Fleetwood, S. (1996). Hayek’s Political Economy: The Socio-Economics of Order, 
London: Routledge. 
George, D. (2008). Issues in Heterodox Economics, New York: Wiley. 
Goto, H. (1982). Animal Taxonomy, London: Edward Arnold. 
Gruchy, A. (1947). Modern Economic Thought: the American contribution, 
New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
_________ (1948). ‘The Philosophical Basis of the New Keynesian Economics’, Ethics, 
58(4): 235-44. 
Hair, J., Black, W., Babin, B., Anderson, R. and Tatham, R. (2006). Multivariate Data 
Analysis, New Jersey: Pearson. 
Hollander, S. (1981). ‘Marxian Economics as General-Equilibrium Theory’, History of 
Political Economy, XIII, Spring: 121-54. 
King, J. (2002). A History of Post Keynesian Economics since 1936, Cheltenham: Elgar. 
Lawson, T. (2006). ‘The Nature of Heterodox Economics’, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 30 (4): 483-505. 
Lee, F. (2009). Challenging the Mainstream: Essays on the History of Heterodox 
Economics in the 21
st Century, London: Routledge. 
Macauley, C., Kogan, N., and Teger, A. (1971). ‘Order Effects in Answering Risk 
Dilemmas for Self and Others’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 20 (3): 
423-424. 
Mayr, E. (1969). Principles of Systematic Zoology, New York: McGraw-Hill.  
Mearman, A. (2007). ‘Rhetorical Dualism and the Orthodox/Heterodox Distinction in 
Economics’, ICAPE conference, Salt Lake City, UT, June 2007. 
Robinson, J. (1974). ‘History versus Equilibrium’, Thames Papers in Political Economy.  
   28 
Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1a: Descriptive statistics of survey data 
  N  Mode   Mean  SD 
mainstream  43  .00  .1341  .17317 
heterodox  43  1.00  .8221  .19436 
pluralist  43  1.00  .7105  .29207 
rational  43  .00, 
.10 
.2186  .21906 
equilibrium  43  .00  .1773  .22206 
class  43  1.00  .6701  .26847 
positive  43  .00  .2047  .24344 
natural  43  .90  .7166  .24807 
uncertain  43  .90  .7291  .25053 
fallibility  43  .90  .7093  .31496 
power  43  .90  .8047  .25816 
labour  43  1.00  .6839  .32363 
scarcity  43  .00  .3651  .30910 
gender  43  .50  .5558  .30437 
maths  43  .20  .3488  .28316 
individuals  43  .20  .2139  .23055 
markets  43  .20  .3058  .25523 
money  43  .50  .5416  .29516 
history  43  .90  .9081  .12580 
Sex  43    .19   
 
Table 1b: Age statistics 
  n  min  max  mean 




17       
Age 
45-59 




12       
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Table 2: Correlations between variables  
 
  he  p  r  e  c  ps  n  un  fa  pw  la  sc  ge  mt  in  mk  mo  hi 




.42             
He                  -
.38 
  .32            .43   
Pl                  .52                   
Ra        .40    .36            .31        .33     
Eq            .70            .34      .36      -.33 
Cl             -.32        .59  .70    .61  .35  -.35  .48     
Ps                -
.39 
      .40  -
.55 
         
Na                    .37        .33         
Un                   .46        .38  -
.32 
       
Fa                                      
Pw                      .44  -
.34 
.48      -.36     
La                          .36      -.41     
Sc                                     
Ge                                     
Mt                                     
In                                .43    -.39 
Mk                                     
Mo                                     
Hi                                     
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Table 3: Factor Analysis results 
 
Factor 
  1  2  3  4  5 
positive  .859         
equilibrium  .853         
scarcity  .564         
rational  .515         
class    .871       
labour    .866       
power    .652       
markets    -.626       
gender    .551       
fallibility      .775     
uncertain      .773     
individuals      .616     
natural        .830   
maths        .666   
money          .835 
history          .650 
Cronbach’s 
alpha  .723  .542  .614  .488  .353 
Eigenvalues  4.219  2.284  1.992  1.436  1.297 
% Variance 
explained  26.370  14.277  12.448  8.977  8.104 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy: .640 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity: Approx. Chi-Square 269.198 (p = .000) 
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Table 4: Correlations between cases: Summary 
 
No. of large correlations  No. of cases  Case numbers 
0-10 (‘marginal’)  8  4, 12, 16, 18, 21, 31, 35, 40 
11-20  6  2, 19, 27, 30, 37, 38 
21-30  17  1, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15, 20,23, 
24, 25, 26, 28, 33, 36, 41, 
43 
31+ (‘core’)  12  3, 6, 10, 13, 14, 17, 22, 29, 
32, 34, 39, 42 
 
Table 5: Strong correlations between ‘marginal’ cases 
 





4              x    3  6  10 
12                x  0  1  2 
16        x    x      0  4  6 
18      x            0  0  1 
21                  3  4  7 
31      x            3  4  8 
35  x                2  1  4 
40    x              4  4  9 
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Table 6: Variable means by cluster 
 
   
 
Cluster A 
(n = 20) 
Cluster B 
(n = 4) 
Cluster C 
(n = 11) 
Cluster D 
(n = 8) 
mainstream  .0708  .0000  .2136  .2500 
heterodox  .8750  .8625  .8045  .6938 
pluralist  .7425  .4250  .7909  .6625 
rational  .1625  .1250  .2455  .3688 
equilibrium  .1086  .0250  .3182  .2313 
class  .7482  1.0000  .6818  .2938 
positive  .1075  .0000  .3864  .3000 
natural  .7350  .7500  .6922  .6875 
uncertain  .9050  .4875  .5045  .7188 
fallibility  .8825  .1375  .7091  .5625 
power  .9050  .9750  .8091  .4625 
labour  .7675  1.0000  .7736  .1938 
scarcity  .2200  .0875  .6364  .4938 
gender  .6550  .8000  .5000  .2625 
maths  .2850  .5750  .5545  .1125 
individuals  .2425  .0250  .1680  .3000 
markets  .3575  .0250  .2091  .4500 
money  .6523  .5875  .4175  .4125 
history  .9450  .9375  .9091  .8000 
age  48.75  54.50  47.40  53.25 
sex  .35  .0000  .09  .00 
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Figure 1: Dendrogram; Ward’s method; cluster variates: all variates 
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Appendix: Questionnaire tool 
WHAT ARE THE CORE ECONOMIC PRECEPTS? 
 
This survey is being conducted by Andrew Mearman (Bristol Business School, UWE). It is an 
investigation into the concepts and methods which economists regard as core. Please indicate on 
the sliding scale between 0 and 10 the extent to which you agree with the statement (0 = 
completely disagree, 10 = agree completely). All responses will be treated anonymously. The 
questionnaire should not take more than 5 minutes to complete. Thank you for your time. 
 
  Disagree                              Agree 
Example: Elephants are grey  0_____________________x__10 
   
1. I consider myself a ‘mainstream’ economist  0_______________________10 
2. I consider myself a ‘heterodox’ economist  0_______________________10 
3. I consider myself a ‘pluralist’ economist  0_______________________10 
4. Economic agents are rational (usually maximisers)  0_______________________10 
5. Economic systems tend towards equilibrium  0_______________________10 
6. Class is an essential factor in understanding economic 
outcomes 
0_______________________10 
7. Economics is a positive science  0_______________________10 
8. Economics should explicitly take into account natural 
systems 
0_______________________10 
9. Economic outcomes are inherently (non-probabilistically) 
uncertain 
0_______________________10 
10. All economic theories, methods and approaches are 
fallible: a variety is needed 
0_______________________10 
11. Power is an essential factor in understanding economic 
outcomes 
0_______________________10 
12. Labour inputs are an essential determinant of the value of 
a product 
0_______________________10 
13. Economics is the study of scarcity and choice  0_______________________10 
14. Gender is an essential factor in understanding economic 
outcomes 
0_______________________10 
15. Economic enquiry requires the use of mathematical 
methods 
0_______________________10 
16. Economics is primarily concerned with individuals  0_______________________10 
17. Markets are generally the best way to ensure that wants 
and needs are met efficiently 
0_______________________10 
18. Money is a determinant of real economic activity  0_______________________10 




20. Which journal would you consider the ‘best’ in which you could attempt to publish?  (please 
state) ___________________________________________ 
21. What is your age? ____ 
22. What is your sex? ____ 
23. What is your institution? _____________________________________ 
 
All responses will be treated anonymously. 
Thank you for taking your time to complete this questionnaire.  
 